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I. 
There is an emerging body of evidence (Bessen and Meurer [2008], Lerner [2008] 
and Mokyr [2008], for example) that patents do not have much impact on innovation. It is 
true that standard models of capital ladders such as Scotchmer [1991], Boldrin and 
Levine [2004], and Llanes and Trento [2007] allow for the possibility of patents 
discouraging innovation. However this can only be a long-run consequence: innovation is 
discouraged when so many patents have been created that additional innovation becomes 
dependent on them. The evidence in Lerner [2008], among other, shows that even in the 
short-run there is no increase in innovation from strengthening patent protection. From 
the perspective of existing theory this is a puzzle.  
The standard theory of innovation is essentially a static theory: incurring a fixed cost 
creates a unit of knowledge that is then available to all for free. So-called Schumpeterian 
models of knowledge creation, such as those of Aghion and Howitt [1992], while 
ostensibly dynamic, simply stack a sequence of these static models end-to-end. 
This standard approach rests on two technological assumptions: fixed cost of creation 
and free availability of newly created knowledge. In earlier work (Boldrin and Levine 
[2002, 2008b]) we challenged the latter assumption, and we discussed the evidence 
against it extensively in Boldrin and Levine [2008a]. However, like the rest of the 
profession, until recently we accepted the conventional wisdom that, following the 
expense of a fixed cost, knowledge springs full-grown in the form of an “eureka 
moment”. The goal of this paper is to challenge such wisdom and to argue that 
diminishing returns in knowledge creation is at least as plausible – and has profoundly 
different implications for the impact of monopoly on innovation. The implications for the 
facts that motivated the standard fixed cost theory are the same. However, from the 
perspective of a theory of diminishing returns in knowledge creation, the failure of 
government granted monopolies to increase innovations is not a puzzle at all – it is a key 
prediction.  
What is the evidence that knowledge arises in “eureka moments?” It is true that 
innovators work on new ideas for some period of time before marketing them or 
implementing them in new products. It is also true that, after ideas are brought to market, 
the process of creating original knowledge is replaced by the process of making cheap 
copies. Superficially this suggests that ideas have little value until they reach “fruition”,   2
after which they are revealed and cheaply copied. Our goal is to show that these same 
facts are consistent with a diminishing returns technology for the creation of new ideas. 
The key intuition is that even with diminishing returns and perfect divisibility, the first 
few shards of new knowledge – the unfinished notes, the dead-ends that have been 
encountered, the computer program with many bugs – have enormous value in the 
process of further knowledge creation. This means that even if incomplete or imperfectly 
polished products are valued positively by consumers, it is optimal to keep them off the 
market for an initial period of time.  
Our story is this. Knowledge is encapsulated in perfectly divisible blueprints. In 
general, original knowledge creation generates new blueprints from existing blueprints 
and labor. Initially, though, labor alone must be used as no original knowledge actually 
exist; implying that the technology for producing original knowledge allows for positive 
output from labor alone. It is also natural to think that initially the first few bits of 
knowledge are much more useful in the production of additional new knowledge than in 
consumption or in being spread around by making copies of themselves. In such a world, 
the social optimum is to use labor and all the knowledge acquired so far to increase the 
amount of new knowledge for a time. Eventually diminishing returns to the production of 
new knowledge sets in: it becomes optimal to produce cheap copies and consume them; 
at this point the original knowledge creation process is phased out as the idea is 
“complete” and it comes to “fruition”. If we treated new knowledge creation as a black 
box and thought of a static model in which “usable” knowledge jumped full-grown out of 
the box, this would look like a “fixed cost plus cheap reproduction” model. Yet probing 
the black box, we see that, in fact, this is a standard diminishing returns economy and has 
no increasing returns to scale. 
In the fixed cost plus cheap reproduction story, there is no cumulative process of 
knowledge creation: there are “eureka moments” in which a fully usable piece of 
knowledge appears. However, knowledge creation does not generally proceed in that 
way. We do not generally write a finished first chapter first: we write an outline of the 
whole book, a sketch of each chapter, and so forth. Then we begin the process of revision 
and polishing until we get to the complete product. In doing this we go back to what we 
did before and change it, producing additional bits of usable knowledge in an almost 
seamless path. So it is far from clear that two copies of an incomplete discovery – the   3
notes containing the intuition, the first few experiments, and so forth – would be worth 
less to consumers than one copy of the complete one. But regardless, if we take the 
extreme view that there is an indivisibility – that the “discovery” is worthless until it is 
available as an entire unit – its indivisibility may not matter simply because the “idea” 
was not going to be used anyway until that point. 
In terms of patents: the implication is that for those products and industries for which 
diminishing returns is the relevant model, government awarded monopolies, although 
they will be valued by those getting the monopolies, will strictly reduce welfare. Worse, 
while monopolists may bring their product to market earlier, they will do so by skimping 
on research and development. In this setting individual patents will reduce, rather than 
increase, innovation. 
II. 
We take time 0 t ≤< ∞  to be continuous. Consider the market for a new 
product that did not previously exist. Consumers derive utility from consuming  t x units 
of the product, and provide labor,  t A , according to the discounted present value 
 
0
[( ) ] t
tt eu x w d t ρ ∞ − − ∫ A . 
We assume that u  is strictly increasing, finite, strictly concave, and twice continuously 
differentiable for  () s u p( ) t ux u <⋅ . Since the good is not aggregate consumption, but 
rather a single new product, we think it is natural to assume that  '(0) u <∞ with 
lim '( ) 0
t xt ux →∞ = . Labor is in limited supply with  t L ≤ A .  
  In the model, knowledge is encapsulated in blueprints  0 t k ≥ . Initially there are 
no blueprints, so  0 0 k = . However, there is an original knowledge creation technology 
for creating blueprints from labor and blueprints. The simplest and most traditional 
method of combining capital and labor might seem the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. However, the Cobb-Douglas cannot produce any output if the capital input is 
zero, so we use a perturbed Cobb-Douglas technology to express the fact that new 
knowledge can be created from labor alone 
  () ot ot t kA k αβ η =+  A  
where  0, , 0, 1, 0 A αβ α β η >> + < > , and  0, 0 ot t k ≥≥ A  are the blueprints and 
labor used in creating original knowledge. Notice that once labor is allocated to the   4
original creation process, the marginal product of blueprints is very high (infinite at 
0 o k = ). This is the opposite of the usual assumption. In standard theory it is assumed 
that nothing of value is produced until a threshold is reached. By contrast we assume that 
the very few first bits of knowledge – incomplete sketches, intuitions, and so forth – are 
extremely valuable in the production of additional original knowledge. The apple 
contributed great value to Newton’s understanding of gravitation. 
We assume there is also a technology for the inexpensive copying, or imitation, of 
blueprints. This is given by  ct ct kB k =  , where B ρ >  and  ct k  are the blueprints used for 
making copies. This is like a copying machine, or the competitive market: put in an 
original or copy, and some number B of new copies are produced. As it is often the case, 
original knowledge and its imitations are perfect substitutes.  
Lastly, blueprints can be used to produce a flow of consumption. It is convenient 
to assume that the units are chosen such that  tx t xk =  where  xt k  are the blueprints used 
to produce consumption. 
We can summarize the accumulation technology by the equation of motion for the 
total amount of blueprints available 
  ()( ) to t t t t o t kA k B k x k αβ η =+ + − −  A  
along with the constraints  ,, 0 , 0 ot t t t t ot kx k x k ≥− − ≥ A . Notice that the rate of 
increase of knowledge capital is bounded by 
  max{ ( ) , } ttt kA k L B k αβ η ≤+  , 






t eu K d t ρ ∞ − <∞ ∫ . 
An example of a function satisfying our assumptions is  () 1 t x
t ux e − =− . 
III. 
  We first give a technical characterization of the optimal plan. 
                                                 
1 Note that this forces lim '( ) 0
t xt ux →∞ =  so that assumption is redundant.   5
Proposition 1: A unique continuous optimal plan {, , , } to ttt kk x A  exists and is 
characterized by Lagrange multipliers  0 t λ ≥  that evolve according to  
  ()
1
tt o t t Akαβ λλ ρ α − ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦
 A   
and satisfy the transversality condition  0 t
tt ek ρ λ − → , and by first order conditions 
  1 () to t t Ak w αβ λβ η − +≥ A , with equality if  t L < A  
  1 '( ) tto t t ux A kαβ λα− ⎡⎤ ≤ ⎣⎦ A , with equality if  0 t x >  
  1
ot t BA k αβ α − ⎡⎤ ≤ ⎣⎦ A , with equality if  0 tto t kxk −− >  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
; 
Our primary goal is to understand how the technology for original creation 
interacts with the copying technology and with consumption. Our key result is that, 
initially, only the original creation technology is used and, for a while, blueprints are not 
used either for copying or consumption.  
Proposition 2: There is a time  0 T >  such that if 0 tT ≤≤  then in the optimal plan 
has  ,0 ct xt kk= . 
Proof:  From the first order conditions and  '( ) '(0) t ux u ≤ , if 
(*)  11 '(0), to t t o t t Ak u Ak B αβ αβ λα α −− >> AA  
then the optimal plan is  ,0 ct xt kk= . In particular, since the optimal plan is continuous, it 
suffices to prove that these inequalities hold as  0 ot k → . Notice that, by continuity, 
0 0 t λλ →> . If  0 L = A  the result follows immediately. Otherwise we may solve the 
first order condition for the optimal use of labor, 
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and substitute it into (*) to find the conditions 
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, 
from which the result again follows as  0 ot k →  and  0 0 t λλ →> . 
; 
  Our second result shows that the use of the original creation technology is 
temporary in the sense that asymptotically it is not used at all, and after a point in time, 
some knowledge capital is always used for consumption. 
Proposition 3: In the optimal plan:  t λ  is decreasing, lim 0 tt λ →∞ = ,  t x  is increasing, 
lim '( ) 0 tt ux →∞ = , and  lim , 0 to t t k →∞ → A . 
Proof:  Observe that  ()
1
tt o t t Akαβ λλ ρ α − ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦
 A  and  1
ot t BA k αβ α − ⎡ ⎤ ≤ ⎣ ⎦ A  imply 
/0 tt B λλ ρ ≤−<  . Notice that  τ λ <∞ for  0 τ > . Hence not only is  t λ  decreasing, 
but by integrating both sides of the inequality, it satisfies a bound of the form 
() ( ) Bt
t e ρτ
τ λλ −− − ≤ , so certainly lim 0 tt λ →∞ = . 
  Next suppose for st >  that  st xx < . The labor supply can be solved from the 
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This is increasing in  t λ  and decreasing in  ot k . Since  0 t x >  from the first order 
conditions  1 '( ) ( , ) tto t t o t ux A k k αβ λα λ − ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ A . Since  st xx <  and since  t λ  is decreasing it 
follows from  1 '( ) ( , ) sso s s o s ux A k k αβ λα λ − ⎡⎤ ≤ ⎣⎦ A  that 
   11 (, ) (, ) os s os ot t ot Ak k Ak k αβ αβ αλ αλ −− > AA  
 and so  0 cs ct kk >≥ . This implies   7
   11 (, ) (, ) os s os ot t ot BA k k A k k B αβ αβ αλ αλ −− =>≥ AA ,  
a contradiction. 
Next suppose that  '( ) t ux is bounded away from zero, say by  ' u . From 
()
1
tt o t t Akαβ λλ ρ α − ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦
 A  and  1 '( ) tto t t ux A kαβ λα− ⎡ ⎤ ≤ ⎣ ⎦ A  we have  ' tt u λρ λ ≤−  . 
Since lim 0 tt λ →∞ = , eventually  '/ t u λρ <  implying that  0 t λ <  after a certain time, 
which is impossible. 
  Next observe that  1
ot BA k L αβ α − ≤  implies an upper bound on  ot k . Since 
0 t λ →  and  ot k  is bounded above we see that this implies  0 t → A . Then the first order 
condition  1
ot t BA k αβ α − ≤ A  also implies  0 ot k → . 
; 
  The role of the copying technology is less straightforward, in accordance with 
available evidence. If marginal utility, hence demand, falls rapidly to zero, it may be that 
the copying technology is never used and knowledge goes directly from the original 
creator to the consumers, without imitators stepping in to copy. We would expect 
copying to be relevant when there is strong demand for a large number of copies of the 
consumption good. Specifically, let us define strong asymptotic demand. 
Definition 4: We say that demand is strong asymptotically if  '( ) t wx
t ux w e − ≥ .  
An example of a utility function with asymptotically strong demand is  () 1 t x
t ux e − =− . 
We can then show that, while asymptotically the original creation technology is 
abandoned, the copying technology is used – that is, when demand is strong, after a time 
copying takes over the discovery process and imitators enter the market. 
Proposition 5: If demand is asymptotically strong, then in the optimal plan 
limsup 0 ct k > . 
Proof: As before, we observe from the first order conditions that  () tt B λρ λ ≥−   and 
that, for  B γρ =−  and Ge τγ
τ λ = , this implies that  t
t Ge γ λ − ≤ .  
  Next observe that since  0 t x >  for large t  we have, for all sufficiently large t , 
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∞ −−
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Since   8
  ()
0
0' ( ) ' ( 0 ) / st
ts eu x d s u ρ ρ
∞ −−
+ ≤≤ ∫  
and  0 t λ → , we see that  t U  is bounded asymptotically. Since  tt UU ρ =  , it follows that 
0 t U = .  
  Combining these two steps, we see that for t  large enough we can write 
t
t Ge γ λ − ≤  as  
  ()
0
'( ) st t
ts eu x d s G e ργ ∞ −− −
+ ≤ ∫ . 
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By assumption  '( ) tT wk
tT uk w e + −
+ ≥ , so 











≥− + . 
Since  ,0 ot t k → A  we must have  0 ot k →  , hence limsup 0 ct k >  , implying 
limsup 0 ct k > .  
 
;   9
IV. 
  Suppose that a single monopolist controls the market for this product, and that she 
maximizes the present value of her profits. This amounts to replacing  () t ux  with 
() ' () R
tt t vx u x x =  in the optimization problem. Notice that revenue  () R
t vx may actually 
be decreasing for large  t x  and may fail to be concave. Assuming that it is concave and 
that  () t ux  is three times continuously differentiable, we may define 
() m a x ()
st
R
tx x s vx v x ≤ = . Then  () t vx  satisfies the properties we have assumed of a 
utility function, and since  t x  will never be chosen so large that  () () R
tt vx v x ≠  yields the 
solution to the monopoly problem. The key difference with the original problem is that  
() t vx  has a lower marginal utility of consumption than  () t ux  at all levels of  0 t x > , 
because  '( ) '( ) ''( ) ttt t vx ux uxx =+ . 
  We can develop some simple intuition about the impact of introducing a 
monopoly on the timing and nature of innovation. Use superscripts u  and v to denote, 
respectively, the solution to the competitive and the monopolistic problem. Let T  be the 
time for which  0 u
t x >  for tT >  and  0 u
t x =  for tT ≤ . Notice that  
  ()
0
'( ) vt T v
TT t ev x d t ρ λ
∞ −−
+ = ∫ . 
If this remains unchanged the monopoly solution,  v
t x , must involve less final product 
sales than under competition,  u
t x  for tT ≥ . Therefore, there must be less capital under 
monopoly than competition,  vu
TT kk < . There are two ways to produce less capital and the 
monopolistic optimum will require both be used. First, less labor should be used in the 
original creation process  vu
tt < AA  for tT ≤ . Second,  v
t x  should become positive earlier 
than  u
t x . 
One could say that, in this sense, “innovation takes place more quickly” under 
monopoly than competition because the new consumption good is brought to the 
consumers earlier. However, a smaller quantity is sold and at a higher price; further, less 
labor is used in original creation, vu
tt < AA , meaning that the monopolist also produces 
less original knowledge and does less “R&D” than under competition. In this, more 
relevant, sense the monopolist innovates less than under competition. 
  One way to think of this is in terms of the “public-private partnership” under 
which universities are encouraged to patent ideas developed using government funding. 
By awarding a monopoly we would expect less actual research to be done at universities,   10
but the results of the research that did take place would be made available to industry 
sooner. It is claimed that the “public-private partnership” has been a great success 
because of the latter. In this model, that is unambiguously bad, as scientific resources 
( t k ) are misallocated to industrial applications when it would be better, from a social 
point of view, to use them in producing more original research that would, optimally, be 
brought to industrial fruition somewhat later. 
V. 
The standard theory of innovation based on the “fixed cost of discovery plus 
cheap copying” predicts that strengthening patents should increase innovation. 
Overwhelming empirical evidence shows that strengthening patents does little, or 
nothing, positive to innovation, which is most puzzling for standard theory. We argue 
that, even if it “looks like” there is a fixed cost of creation, in fact there is none. We argue 
instead that the discovery activity is best represented by a decreasing returns technology 
in which the first few units of new knowledge are so valuable that, for a while, they are 
optimally invested in producing further knowledge instead of making copies of 
themselves or producing consumption.  
We develop a model that captures this intuition and is consistent with a set of 
widely held facts about innovative activity. This is a model of competitive discovery with 
copying under decreasing returns to scale; in this world, introducing a patent is damaging 
to welfare: it does not increase the rate of innovation and may even reduce it.  
The widely discussed puzzle, according to which stronger patents do not increase 
innovative activity, is no longer a puzzle.  
Appendix: Proposition 1 
  The result is relatively standard, and can be derived by defining  () t Vk  to the sup 
of utility achievable with continuous paths of the controls starting at the initial capital  t k . 
This is strictly increasing and strictly concave, so quite well behaved from a differential 
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subject to  ()( ) to t t t t o t kA k B k x k αβ η =+ + − −  A . The Lagrange multipliers (or costate 
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